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ARTICLE
MARYLAND TORT DAMAGES: A FORM OF SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION

By: Rebecca Korzec*
I. INTRODUCTION

Maryland law provides that "compensatory damages are not to be
awarded in negligence or strict liability actions absent evidence that
the plaintiff suffered a loss or detriment."} At the same time,
Maryland imposes a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in tort
claims for personal injury.2 First enacted in 1986, the statutory cap
imposed a $350,000 limit on recovery of noneconomic damages. 3
Following a Court of Appeals of Maryland decision that the cap did
not apply to wrongful death actions,4 the Maryland General Assembly
explicitly modified the statute to include wrongful death actions. s At
the same time, the cap was increased to $500,000 for causes of action
arising after October 1, 1994. 6 In 1996, the Maryland General
Assembly increased the cap by an additional $15,000 for causes of
action arising after October 1, 1995. 7 A single cap applies to the
action of an injured spouse and includes the award for loss of
consortium. 8
In this essay, I argue that the statutory cap on noneconomic
damages in Maryland disproportionately disadvantages women. For
this reason, the cap, although facially neutral, is in fact discriminatory
*Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law
I. Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 735, 591 A.2d 544,561 (1991).
2. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (West 1986).
3. Id., see also Gooslin v. State, 132 Md. App. 290, 298,752 A.2d 642,646 (2000) (holding
cap does not violate equal protection claims); Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App. 133,
573 A.2d 853 (1990), affd 325 Md. 342, 370, 601 A.2d 102, 116 (1992) (holding a cap
on noneconomic damages is constitutional).
4. United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 552, 620 A.2d 905, 915 (1993).
5. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 11-108(a)(I)(ii) (West Supp. 1994) [hereinafter
CTS. & JUD. PROC.j.
6. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-1 08(b )(2)(i).
7. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West Supp. 1995). The $15,000 increase will take effect on
October 1 of each year.
8. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 37-38,660 A.2d 423, 430 (1995); see also Klein v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 492-94, 608 A.2d 1276, 1283-84 (1992) (holding
spouse entitled to damages for loss of services, affection, society and sexual relationship
deceased spouse would have contributed if spouse had lived).
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in its impact on female litigants. 9 In addition, the cap may have the
unintended effect of limiting the quality of the legal representation
available to female tort litigants in Maryland. 1O Moreover, several
other issues in Maryland tort law may inadvertently contribute to
discrimination against women litigants. These include the Maryland
adherence to contributory negligence as a complete bar to negligence
claims and the Maryland approach to punitive damages. Ultimately,
Maryland tort law, although facially neutral, disadvantages women.
II. DEVALUATION OF WOMEN'S WORK
Scholars have suggested that both the method of calculating tort
damages and tort reform legislation, II such as statutory limits on
noneconomic damages, harm women. 12
For example, Martha
Chamallas argues that courts rely on gender-based generalizations in
calculating damages for future earnings. 13 Employing gender-based
tables founded on economic patterns for women results in lower
awards for individual female plaintiffs because the tables project the
fact that women earn less than men. I4 Such damage awards perpetuate
inaccurate gender stereotypes of women, devalue the employment
contributions of individual women and deprive those women of just
compensation for their tort injuries. IS

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.
15.

Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between
Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 643-47
(2006); see generally, Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort,
38 J. LEGALEDUC. 3 (1988) [hereinafter A Lawyer's Primer].
Daniels, supra note 9; see also Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform:
Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1313 (2004) [hereinafter Hidden
Victims].
See, e.g., Finley, Hidden Victims, supra note 10; see generally Leslie Bender, An
Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993); see, e.g.,
Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 463, 465, 503-04, (1998) [hereinafter Architecture of Bias].
See Finley, Hidden Victims, supra note 10, at 1267-80, 1313; see generally Michael L.
Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Workers
and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 733, 744 (1996); Thomas Koenig & Michael
Rustad, His & Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1, 1, 5
(1995).
Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic
Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 73, 75 (1994)
[hereinafter Questioning the Use].
Id.
Id.
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The devaluation of women's work results in lower tort damage
awards which fail to adequately compensate them for their losses.1 6 In
the aggregate, women's tort damage awards are lower than their male
counterparts. I? Since the goal of tort damages is to make the tort
victim whole, it is not surprising that tort damage awards reflect and
reinforce gender disparities. IS In particular, feminist scholars argue
that "tort law devalues the lives, activities, and potential of women,
and that one can see this at work both in substantive rules ~overning
liability and in common methods for calculating damages.,,1 Women
earn less than their male counterparts in all work environments;20
therefore, their economic damages are lower than awards for male
plaintiffs. 21 Martha Chamallas has demonstrated that in a 1995 guide
for personal injury lawyers, awards to male plaintiffs were twentyseven percent higher than for women. 22 Significantly, a nationwide
study of personal injury awards by juries indicated that women
received lower median and mean awards for compensatory damages?3
These studies demonstrate that tort damages reinforce gender-based
stereotypes about women. Contemporary tort law elevates some types
of injuries, giving them more legal protection and awarding greater
damages. Claims and injuries associated with women often receive
less legal protection in the societal hierarchy which tort doctrine
reflects. For example, tort doctrine places a higher value on physical
injury and property loss than emotional harm. Moreover, tort reform
legislation stresses the importance of economic losses, such as lost
income and medical expenses over noneconomic damages, such as

16. [d.
17. [d.
18. See generally John C. Coughenour, The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The
Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745
(1994).
19. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 198 (1999).
20. In 2005, women were paid seventy-seven cents for each dollar paid to men. See
America's
Union
Movement,
EQUAL
PAY
(Mar.
I,
2007),
http://www.aflcio.orglissues/jobseconomy/womenJequalpay.html. Much of the reason for
this is that women perform unpaid childcare, household work and care of elderly
relatives in more significant numbers than men. Scholars have argued that such unpaid
work should be compensated and recognized. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER 125-27 (2000) (proposing that the non-wage earning spouse receive a joint
property right in the income of the wage earning spouse); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning
Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1,3-6 (1996).
21. See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 11, at 464-65.
22. CHAMALLAS, supra note 19.
23. [d.
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pain and suffering, emotional distress, hedonic damages, loss of
companionship and punitive damages. 24
Maryland substantive tort law, like tort law in general, does not
recognize a cause of action for caretakers of children when those
children are injured. As the child's primary caretaker, women usually
have greater responsibility for a child's safety and happiness. Women
caretakers tend to fslace an extremely high value on their relational ties
to their children. 5 When a child is seriously injured, the child's
caretaker also suffers. For example, the caretaker must deal with the
child's injury and disability. The caretaker may feel intense grief and
anxiety, even guilt. The effects of an accident can be life-altering for
the caretaker as well as the child. 26 Yet, tort law largely dismisses the
caretaker's loss, assigning it mere derivative status. It denies a claim
for "filial consortium" for the loss of the child's companionship.27
These losses fall more heavily on women as primary caretakers of
children in our society. Today, most child caretakers are women -. mothers, randmothers, paid nannies, babysitters and day care
providers. 2 Although popular culture praises "stay at home" mothers,
such as the "soccer mom" who abandons the workplace to raise her
children, tort law provides her no separate claim for the devastating
impact of her child's injury on her daily life. The most dramatic,
painful and devastating event in the mother's life, as primary caregiver
of her child, is likely not compensable in tort law.
III. GENDERED TORT REFORM

Added to this problem of undercompensation is the "tort reform" 29
movement, leading to limits on damage recovery, such as statutory
24. Id. at 199.
25. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 135, 153, 157-58 (1992).
26. See, e.g., Regina Graycar, Before the High Court: Women's Work: Who Cares?, 14
SYDNEY L. REV. 86, 87 (1992) (describing hardships suffered by a mother caring for her
disabled daughter).
27. Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course,
1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 50 (1989) [hereinafter A Break in the Silence]. In 1997,
Maryland changed wrongful death actions to permit parents to recover noneconomic
damages for the wrongful death of an adult child. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. §
3-904(e) (LexisNexis 2006).
28. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 25 at 137, 213, 219. Most caretakers and maids in the
United States today are immigrant women of color. BARBARA EHRENREICH & ARLIE
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, GLOBAL WOMEN: NANNIES, MAIDS AND SEX WORKERS IN THE
NEW ECONOMY 6-7 (Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2003).
29. See generally supra note 12.
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caps. This refonn is fueled by what business and insurance interests
consider a litigation explosion, defined by excessive jury awards,
increased class action litigation and frivolous suits. As in Maryland,
the tort reform movement often saw the enactment of legislative limits
or caps on noneconomic damages, often extending beyond medical
malpractice and products liability claims, to include all personal injury
claims.
As previously argued, these caps may have a negative impact on
women. For example, an empirical study by Thomas Koenig and
Michael Rustad indicates that women litigants are detrimentally
affected when noneconomic damages are limited. 30 . The study
demonstrates that women comprise two-thirds of plaintiffs recovering
punitive damages in medical malpractice cases, particularly in genderlinked cases involving sexual abuse, cosmetic surgery, childbirth and
nursing home abuse. 3 \ Moreover, significant mass products liability
litigation has focused on women's reproductive health and genderlinked injuries. These include the Dalkon Shield, Norplant, breast
implants and super absorbent tampons. Clearly, limiting noneconomic
damages in these products liability cases hanns female plaintiffs.
Although this gendered result may be completely inadvertent or
unintended, its effect is devastating.
Koenig and Rustad demonstrate that limiting noneconomic
damages disproportionately affects female litigants. 32 Women earn
lower incomes, largely because they spend more time on unpaid child
care, housekeeping and other relational care. As a result, female
litigants tend to have lesser economic losses than their male
counterparts. 33 Moreover, physical injuries to women may not result
in significant damages awards since no current medical treatments
may exist. 34 For example, a "soccer mom" who suffers injury by
having to undergo a hysterectomy caused by a Dalkon Shield or other
intrauterine device suffers little economic harm. Restricting or
limiting her noneconomic damages may result in an insignificant
award of damages. For those reasons, Martha Chamallas argues that:
"For feminists who maintain that the market reflects and reinforces
30. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 12, at 85.
31. [d. at 61-62.
32. [d. at 80.
33. [d. at 78-79.
34. See Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reformfor Women, 64
TENN. L. REV. 847,847-57, 861-66, 870 (1997); see also Koenig & Rustad, supra note
12, at 64-77.
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cultural biases and systems of privilege, changing tort law to curtail
noneconomic damages seems misguided. They argue that such reform
solidifies the tendency to privilege economic losses over noneconomic
ones, and intensifies implicit gender bias in tort law.,,35
Medical malpractice litigation has been a source of substantial
reform efforts.
Generally, advocates of caps on noneconomic
damages argue for practical results rather than doctrinal purity. The
argument goes that caps will lead to lower malpractice premiums for
physicians preventing them from deserting certain medical specialties
or geographical areas. Similarly, in the products liability arena, caps
are viewed as an instrument for preventing manufacturer abandonment
of significant innovation and product development or from engaging
in a "race to the bottom" offering the least possible protection for the
victims of defective products.
However, the nexus between damages caps and these legitimate
policy issues remain attenuated. For example, in addressing the
medical malpractice issue, a 2003 General Accounting Office study
found:
Interested parties debate the impact these various
measures may have had on premium rates. However, a
lack of comprehensive data on losses at the insurance
company level makes measuring the precise impact of
the measures impossible. As noted earlier, in the vast
majority of cases, existing data do not categorize losses
on claims as economic or noneconomic, so It IS not
possible to quantify the impact of a cap on
noneconomic damages on insurers' losses. Similarly, it
is not possible to show exactly how much a cap would
affect claim frequency or claims-handling costs. In
addition, while most claims are settled and caps apply
only to trial verdicts, some insurers and actuaries told
us that limits on damages would still have an indirect
impact on settlements by limiting potential damages
should the claims go to trial. But given the limitations
on measuring the impact of caps on trial verdicts, an

35. CHAMALLAS, supra note 19, at 202.
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indirect impact would be even more difficult to
measure. 36
Moreover, Lucinda Finley's 2004 review of the efficacy of
statutory limitations on noneconomic damages reached similar
results. 37 She argues that women will be among the "hidden victims
of tort reform" who will be less likely to obtain lawyers willing to
represent them?8 Professor Finley's empirical study included analysis
of jury verdicts in Maryland, Florida and California. She concludes
that women, children and the elderly will be most affected by damage
caps, arguing: "[T]hese disparate negative effects will be especially
pronounced for elderly women. . . . [C]ap laws will also place an
effective ceiling on recovery for certain types of injuries
disproportionately experienced by women, including sexual assault
and gynecological injury, that impair childbearing or sexual
functioning. ,,39
Lucinda Finley concludes that decreasing the recovery value of
these injuries for women will mean that lawyers will be unwilling to
take meritorious claims which are not cost-efficient.4o She argues that
the effect of statutory damage caps will be "[T]he message that
women, the elderly, and the parents of dead children should not bother
to apply.,,41
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Maryland approach to punitive damages aggravates the
statutory cap problem by making it extremely difficult to recover
punitive damages. For the plaintiff to recover punitive damages, the
defendant must be characterized by "evil motive, intent to injure, or
fraud,,,42 i.e., actual malice. Essentially a two-prong test has evolved:
First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had actual
36. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 42-43 (2003).
37. Finley, Hidden Victims, supra note 10, at 1267-80.
38. Jd. at 1313.

39. Jd.
40. Jd.
41. Jd.; see generally Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993) (arguing that tort reform makes
contingency fee-based law practices less profitable, forcing plaintiffs lawyers to
represent fewer litigants or abandon the market altogether).
42. Owens Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 533, 726 A.2d 745,784 (1999); OwensIllinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460, 601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992).
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knowledge of the defect. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant exhibited deliberate disregard of the consequences of that
defect. 43 Moreover, punitive damages must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. 44
Noneconomic damage recovery, such as the award of punitive
damages, is extremely important to women litigants because they heTs
counteract the low value placed on women's economic claims. 5
Punitive damages, pain and suffering and other noneconomic damage
awards help correct the bias in tort damage awards. Preferring
economic losses over noneconomic claims reinforces implicit gender
bias.
V. COMPARATIVE FAULT AND CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE
Although the doctrine of comparative fault 46 is accepted in almost
every jurisdiction, Maryland has not adopted it. 47 Comparative fault's
widespread acceptance stems from the harshness of the contributory
negligence rule which bars a plaintiff from any recovery against a
tortfeasor, if the plaintiff was at fault in any respect in connection with
the accident. 48 The harshness and potential unfairness of the
contributory negligence approach is that it "[P]laces upon one party
the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis,
responsible.,,49 By contrast, the doctrine of comparative fault does not
take this all-or-nothing approach to accident liability. Rather the
doctrine proportionately reduces the accident victim's damages
according to the victim's fault. 5o The doctrine can significantly alter
the results in products liability and other litigation. 51
43. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 462,601 A.2d at 653.
44. [d. at 469,601 A.2d at 657.
45. Finley, supra note 34 (arguing that tort refonn proposals have a "possible adverse impact

on women and women's health.").
46. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (2005) 811 n.l [hereinafter OWEN,

47.
48.

49.
50.
51.

PRODUCTS LAW]; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 67, at 468-69 (5th ed. 1984).
The only other jurisdictions are Alabama, The District of Columbia, North Carolina and
Virginia. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LAW, supra note 46.
[d. at 811.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 46.
OWEN, PRODUCTS LAW, supra note 46, at 811-12.
See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cm!. a (2000);
UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT REsPONSIBILITY ACT § 3 (amended 2003), 12 U.L.A. 12
(Supp. 2006).
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Maryland's contributory negligence doctrine may be especially
problematic for women litigants. Feminist scholars argue that
negligence's "reasonable person" standard may not reflect women's
experiences and sensibilities. 52 The "reasonable person" standard is a
mainstay of the view that law is objective in viewpoint. The objective,
"reasonable person" standard is intended to encourage the trier of fact
to reach an unbiased result, which avoids the perspective of either
litigant. 53 However, this "objectivity" has been criticized as an
example of "point-of-viewlessness,,,54 which actually ignores
women's experiences by adopting the viewpoint of the dominant, male
groUp.55
Maryland's view of the sole proximate harm issue complicates the
contributory negligence problem. Anthony Pools v. Sheehan 56 is an
example of these issues in current Maryland products liability law. In
Maryland, plaintiff's contributory negligence defeats a negligence
claim. However, simgle contributory negligence cannot bar a strict
liability in tort claim.
To bar the strict liability claim, the plaintiff
must assume the risk. 58 Nevertheless, in Maryland, the doctrine of
"sole proximate cause" may brin~ ordinary contributory negligence
back into a products liability case. 5 In a strict products liability claim,
the plaintiff must still demonstrate that the product defect is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. 6o In effect, the same actions
which might be considered plaintiff's contributory negligence may
52. A Lawyer's Primer, supra note 9, at 31 (stating that "Negligence law could begin with ..
. the feminine voice's ethic of care -- a premise that no one should be hurt. We could
convert the present standard of 'care of a reasonable person under the same or similar
circumstances' to a standard of 'conscious care and concern of a responsible neighbor or
social acquaintance for another under the same or similar circumstances. "'). But cf
Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191,214 (arguing
"most neighbors are not caring, and most accident victims are not neighbors. Human
nature will not be altered by holding injurers liable for having failed to take the care that
a caring neighbor would have taken.").
53. CHAMALLAS, supra note 19, at 57.
54. CATHERINEA.MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 162 (1989).
55. [d.
56. 295 Md. 285,455 A.2d 434 (\983) (holding that plaintiff's claim was not barred by his
contributory negligence when he was injured as he fell off the side of the diving board of
his new swimming pool onto the concrete coping at the edge of the pool).
57. Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 626, 440 A.2d 1085, 1092 (1982). The
Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted Part III of the Court of Special Appeals' decision.
Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. at 299, 455 A.2d at 441.
58. See generally Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972).
59. See, e.g., Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. at 622, 440 A.2d at 1090.
60. See id. at 621-23, 440 A.2d at 1090.
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reappear in the defendant's argument as also constituting the sole
proximate cause of the harm. 61 In other words, the plaintiffs risktaking behavior, rather than any alleged product defect, is the "sole
proximate cause" of the product user's harm. 62
In Anthony Pools, in his strict liability tort action, the plaintiff
asserted that the fact that non-skid material on the diving board did not
extend to and over the edges of the diving board constituted a design
defect. 63 Defense counsel argued the plaintiff s injury was not caused
by any product defect, but rather by the way the plaintiff used the
diving board. In closing argument, defense counsel argued:
You must find that this defect proximately caused
the accident. The clear testimony here from Mr.
Weiner and using your common sense is that if
someone steps on the board with about an inch of their
foot on it, they will fall off the side. That was the
proximate cause, the way the board was used, not the
design of the board. I am not willing to concede for a
moment that there is anything defective about the
board .... [E]ven if you feel there was, I ask you to
find that the proximate cause was the way Mr. Sheehan
used it, not the way it was designed. 64
The trial judge denied the defendant's request to instruct the jury
that contributory negligence was a defense, and also denied the
plaintiff s request to instruct the jury that the plaintiff s inadvertence
in using the diving board was not a defense. 65 Reversing the jury
verdict for the defendant, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
held that the trial court should have granted the plaintiffs instruction
on inadvertence. 66
Anthony Pools indicates that juries can be easily confused about the
role of the accident victim's conduct in establishing product defect and
liability. Accident victim carelessness, inadvertence, and risk-taking
activity must be considered, but should not be a complete bar to
See id. at 622, 440 A.2d at 1090.
OWEN, PRODUCTS LAW, supra note 46, at 809-10.
Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. at 616, 440 A.2d at 1087.
[d. at 622, 440 A.2d at 1090. In this case, the defense counsel is using the rubric of "sole
proximate cause" to defeat the plaintiffs strict liability claim by arguing that the way the
plaintiff used the diving board rather than the design of the diving board was the
proximate cause of the injury.
65. /d.
66. [d. at 626, 440 A.2d at 1092.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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products liability recovery. Their effect, as doctrines limiting liability,
and the effect of the doctrine of sole proximate cause, must only be
applied in a manner which assures fairness in products liability
litigation.
Maryland negligence law, with its emphasis on contributory
negligence, adds to the problems women litigants face. In evaluating
whether an individual has acted "reasonably," negligence standards,
by definition, measure women's actions according to traditional male
norms and viewpoints. Male norms simply may ignore the impact of
female experience and conduct on notions of reasonableness.
Similarly, confusing the separate products liability doctrines of defect
and causation with the unhelpful rubric of "sole proximate cause"
reduces the likelihood of achieving a just result.
VI. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
The Products Liability Restatement has not been adopted in
Maryland. Nevertheless, its potential impact on gender discrimination
must be considered. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability has been the subject of considerable debate 67 and criticism. 6s
However, the concerns of feminist jurisprudence have been largely
ignored. 69 Increasingly, feminist scholars 7o have argued that an ethic

67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) [hereinafter PRODUCTS
LIABILITY RESTATEMENT]; see, e.g., Symposium, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability: Is the Best Defense Redefining the Offense?, 26 N. Ky. L. REV. 531, 678
(1999); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement
Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1257 (1993).
68. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1995); see generally John F. Vargo, The
Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns "New Cloth" for Section
402A Products Liability Design Defects: A Survey of the States Reveals a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493 (1996).
69. For a student comment addressing feminist concerns with section 6(c), see Dolly M.
Trompeter, Comment, Sex, Drugs, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 6(c):
Why Comment E is the Answer to the Woman Question, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1139 (1999).
There is considerable feminist jurisprudence on tort law. See, e.g., Bender, A Lawyer's
primer, supra note 9; Bender, supra note 11; Finley, supra note 45; Lucinda M. Finley,
Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAULL. REv. 335 (1999).
70. There are many schools of feminist scholarship including cultural feminists,
accommodation feminists, radical feminists, and critical legal studies feminists. They all
share the goal of incorporating women's experiences and values into law and of
employing feminist methodology. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
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of care,71 promoting considerations of empathy and interdependence
must be integrated into law. Unlike competing analyses, such as the
law and economics approach,n which seek to achieve justice by
deciding disputes with the object of promoting greater social good
through wealth maximization resolutions,73 cultural feminists find the
efficiency norm unworkable. Cultural feminism regards law as just
and equitable only when administered with empathy, resulting in a
redistributive impact for economically and politically disadvantaged
members of societr 74 At first blush, efficiency and empathy appear to
be irreconcilable. 7 Nevertheless, I argue that, in the world of products
liability, efficiency and wealth maximization must be reconciled with
requirements of empathy and fairness.
The Products Liability
Restatement shift from strict liability to negligence essentially adopts
the law and economics focus on efficiency and wealth maximization in
derogation of empathic care as a normative principle of justice. 76 The
claims of cultural feminism, emphasizing empathic care and
interdependence, are essential for a valid products liability doctrine.
Indeed, empathy and efficiency can and must be merged into a
construct where both are achievable and viable.
Major concepts in the law of products liability, such as
defectiveness, causation, and damages, reveal social policy
considerations. One group of scholars emphasizes the role of products
liability law in deterring product injury by providing appropriate
incentives to product manufacturers. The other group focuses on
products liability as an after the fact attempt to achieve corrective
justice between the product producer and the product user. Often the
scholarship of each group either ignores or deprecates the views of the
other. I suggest that feminist jurisprudence may provide an important

71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.

Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories,
42 STAN. L..REv. 617 (1990).
The ethic of care or cultural feminism owes much to the work of Carol Gilligan. See, e.g.,
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of a Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373 (1986); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. I (1988); see
generally MATTHEW H. KRAMER, CRmCAL LEGAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
FEMINISM (1995).
Cf CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 24, 307-08.
See, e.g., Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I
Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law Is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REv.
1125, 1133 (1994); see generally William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE LJ. 1099 (1960).
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bridge in this products liability scholarly gap. Specifically, a cultural
feminist ethic of care can provide significant new insights for products
liability doctrine.
A. Products Liability Goals of Efficiency and Corrective Justice
i

For . more than a decade, a vigorous tort reform debate has
refocused examination of how legal rules promote the goals of
compensation and deterrence. 77 Numerous scholars have studied the
question of how to compensate tort victims for their injuries. 78
Clearly, payments to tort victims can have both compensatory and
deterrent goals. Nevertheless, payments needed to promote deterrence
may not be identical to payments needed to attain compensatory
goals. 79
An important tort compensation theory is the insurance theory -the theory that tort payments should be based on the insurance choices
which individuals would make in actuarially fair markets. 8o The
insurance theory has significant theoretical and practical implications
in that it provides a radical shift from the major compensation
paradigm of tort law -- the "make the tort victim whole" theory of
recovery. 81 Moreover, the insurance theory has received support from
prominent scholars in the tort reform debate, including law and
economics scholar Professor Steven Shavell,82 empirical analysts
Professors W. Kip Viscusi 83 and Patricia Danzon,84 and theorists such

77. See, e.g., Products Liability Law Symposium, 53 S.C. L. REv. 777 (2002).
78. See, e.g., RandalJ R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and
Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989); Stanley
Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772 (1985).
79. See generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96
YALEL.J. 1521 (1987).
80. Id. at 1556 (stating that when the tort victim purchases a product or service she pays in
advance for insurance so that "[C]ompel[ing) insurance greater than the amount
demanded by the purchaser reduces, rather than increases, his or her welfare.").
81. See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 25.1 at 493 (Little, Brown, and Co. 2d ed. 1986) (1956) (examining the
traditional tort damage rule).
82. See Steven ShavelJ, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 260-61 (1987).
83. See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 89-94 (1991).
84. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance
Markets, 13 J. Legal Stud. 517, 520-26 (1984); Patricia M. Danzon, Medical
Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy IO (1985).
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as Professor Alan Schwartz. 85 It is also supported by the American
Law Institute. 86
Some aspects of the Products Liability Restatement, no matter how
well grounded in products liability policy or in theories of justice,
nevertheless, will have the unintended consequences of harming
women. Therefore, the Restatement doctrine must be analyzed and
evaluated. In particular, the Restatement's transition from strict
liability to negligence doctrine raises legitimate concerns for feminists.
Negligence is generally considered more difficult to prove than strict
liability in tort law. 87 Another concern is the adoption of a more
stringent standard for determining medical product and prescription
drug defectiveness than for other products.
An additional concern is normative, asking which values should
fashion products liability doctrine. Products liability doctrine reveals
societal values and priorities in valuing wealth, safety and innovation.
Should products liability be premised on fault or on strict liability?
Should deterrence or compensation be preferred?88
B. Moral and Economic Theories
1.

Corrective Justice and Distributive Justice

Corrective justice seeks to right wrongs by restoring the
balance of rights which have been wrongly disrupted. 89 Suppose a
manufacturer's product Injures a product consumer.
The
manufacturer's liability might depend on concepts of corrective justice
-- what it takes to right the wrong done by the manufacturer. If the
manufacturer is bankrupt or judgment-proof, the issue might be
whether consumers and manufacturers as a group should use some of
their money to help the injured consumer. This becomes a distributive
85. Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
Yale L.J. 353, 362-67 (1988).
86. See The Am. Law Inst. Reporters' Study on Enter. Responsibility for Pers. Injury:
Volume II Approaches to Legal & Institutional Change (1991). This study, released in
April 1991, discusses the insurance theory of compensation, and states that "[e]mpirical
corroboration of these analytical claims" exists. Id. at 206 n.l3; see generally Stephen D.
Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1163 (1992) (book review).
87. See, e.g., Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30,
34-35 (1973).
88. See generally David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 20 I (1995).
89. Catharine Pierce Wells, Ton Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for
Jury Adjudication, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2348, 2350 (1990).
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justice question of how society's assets should be distributed among
people.

2.

Corrective Justice v. Utilitarian Approach to Justice

Corrective justice can be contrasted with a utilitarian approach to
justice. Under a utilitarian approach, we ask what is good for society
as a whole. 9o The manufacturer's fault in causing the product user's
harm is a basis for deciding the case based on corrective justice. 9 ] We
can conclude that the blameworthy manufacturer should pay
compensation to the product user since it redresses a wrong when
compensation is paid. As a result,. fault or unreasonableness provides
a legitimate moral basis for corrective justice.92

3.

Corrective Justice and Strict Liability

In some situations, although neither the product manufacturer nor
the product user is at fault, the user, nevertheless, is injured by the
product. Unless the product manufacturer is held strictly liable, the
innocent product user must bear the loss. In other words, without
manufacturer strict products liability, the blameless product user must
pay for his losses. Therefore, strict products liability is consistent with
concepts of corrective justice. 93
Richard Epstein is a major proponent of strict liability on the basis
of corrective justice. Basically, Epstein argues that strict liability is
preferable to a negligence system because negligence is not morally
grounded. 94 Negligence cannot promote moral responsibility because
it weighs into the balance the social utility of the defendant's conduct
or product. 95 Epstein would argue that regardless of the social utility

90. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict
Liability, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 257,286-93 (1987) (stressing the importance of loss spreading,
fairness and safety in strict products liability).
91. !d. at 286.
92. See generally Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67
Ind. L.J. 349 (1992). Often court decisions confinn the core morality of redressing fault.
Cf Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modem American
Tort Law, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 601 (1992) (analyzing judicial rejection of some forms of strict
liability in products liability cases).
93. See generally Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 259 (1976).
94. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151
(1973).
95. Id. at 153.
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of defendant's product, if it harms the plaintiff, the defendant should
be liable. 96

C.

The Products Liability Restatement Meets the Feminist Ethic of
Care

Cultural feminists argue that tort law should emphasize safety
rather than profit or efficiency.97 They view the masculine voice, with
its protection of rights, autonomy, and abstraction, as a standard which
promotes only efficiency and profit. 98 According to the feminist ethic
of care, a much-needed feminine voice would refocus the tort system
to encourage behavior which is caring about safety and responsive to
victim needs, with their attendant human contexts and consequences. 99
Over the past decade, feminist scholars have provided significant
critiques of tort doctrines.lOo The critiques have applied various
schools of feminist theory. 101
Feminist scholarship has demonstrated that contemporary tort law
reinforces the economic subordination of women. 102 The traditional
devaluation of women's work, including child rearing and
homemaking, has affected the damage awards for women. 103 When
the tort law determines which harms are worthy of legal protection, to
what extent these harms should be compensated, and how they should
be valued, it makes fundamental judgments which affect tort
victims. 104 Tort settlements and damage awards represent both
economic security and fundamental fairness. 105 Moreover, tort law
expresses the social value placed upon certain relationships and
.
106
personaI mterests.
Given the economic position of women, it is not altogether
surprising that women receive less tort compensation than men. The
basic, underlying purpose of tort damages is to place the injured
96. [d.; see generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability: Toward a
Reformation of Tort Law (1980); Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful
Gain, 11 J. Legal Stud. 421 (1982).
97. See, e.g., Bender, A Lawyer's Primer, supra note 9.
98. [d.

99. [d.
100. See generally Bender, supra note II.
101. [d.

102. See Chamallas, supra note 19.
103. [d.

104. See Finley, supra note 10.
105. [d.
106. [d.
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plaintiff in her pre-accident economic position. 107 Most empirical
studies demonstrate that women, regardless of race, receive
significantly lower tort damage awards than white men. !OS
Interestingly, the efforts to study gender and race bias in the courts
have provided much of the data demonstrating the higher value placed
on white men's lives and injuries. 109 For example, as previously
discussed, Martha Chamallas has demonstrated through empirical
studies that awards for male plaintiffs were twenty-seven percent
higher than those for women in a 1995 guide for personal injury
lawyers. I 10
Gender-based generalizations about women lead courts to under
calculate tort damages for the loss of future earning capacity. III
Damages for the loss of future earning capacity compensates the tort
victim for injuries that impair earning power. 112 When a young
woman is injured, economists appearing as expert witnesses often rely
on tables based on past economic patterns. 113 These tables project that
women will work fewer years than men and will earn less money than
their male counte~arts.114 As a result, women receive dramatically
Employing these gender-based generalizations
reduced awards. 1 I
ignores the fact that individual women may alter traditional patterns of
employment participation. Applying liberal feminist principles would
produce tangible gains for women because their experiences and
viewpoints would be the norm rather than the exception.
General tort principles submerged into the Products Liability
Restatement, as previously discussed, create problems from a feminist
perspective. For example, the "reasonable person" tort law standard
can be viewed as problematic. Although the standard may be
perceived as objective, it may actually result in what Catherine
MacKinnon has described as "point-of-viewlessness.,,1l6 Objective
107. Fleming James, Jr., Damages in Accident Cases, 41 Cornell L. Q. 582, 582 (1956).
108. See Charnallas, supra note 19.
109. See generally Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 Signs: J. Women in
Culture and Soc'y 952 (1996).
110. Chamallas, supra note 19.
Ill. See generally Chamallas, Questioning the Use, supra note 13, at 84-89; Chamallas,
Architecture of Bias, supra note 11, at 465-66.
112.ld.
113. ld.
114.ld.
115.ld.
116. MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 162 (arguing that objectivity does not exist -- rather the
attempt to appear objective actually reflects the viewpoint of the dominant group).
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analysis is often the viewpoint of the dominant group, accepted as
valid because the dominant group's version of reality is deemed
true. I I7
Leslie Bender has re-examined the tort "no duty to rescue" doctrine
from a cultural feminist perspective. I 18 Bender argues that liability
should result when an individual refuses to save a stranger since that
stranger should be viewed as a person who is interconnected with the
community and whose well-being, therefore, affects others. 1 19
Another problematic area of the products liability arena is the "fetal
protection" policies which exclude women from certain workplaces. 120
American products liability law, as it developed for three decades,
came closer to achieving these goals than the Products Liability
Restatement. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, if a medical
product harmed a patient, she could be compensated by bringing a tort
claim against the manufacturer. 121 The patient could establish liability
in one of two ways: (1) under a negligence theory, she could establish
liability by proving that the manufacturer lacked due care in designing,
manufacturing or marketing the product; (2) under the theory of strict
liability in tort, she could prove that the product was in a defective
Under the
condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user. 122
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, a patient could find
protection in a tort system concerned with care and safety rather than
insulating product manufacturers from liability.123 This focus on the
product user was to be expected since strict liability in tort, as
recognized by Dean Prosser, a Reporter of the Restatement (Second),
is grounded in notions of fairness and product user protection. 124
However, the "tort reform" movement may have elevated product
innovation, profit maximization and efficiency above user safety.125
117. See id.
118. Bender, A Lawyer's Primer, supra note 9, at 33-36.
119.ld.
120. See generally Sally J. Kenney, For Whose Protection? Reproductive Hazards and
Exclusionary Policies in the United States and Britain (1992) (arguing that "fetal
protection" policies excluding women from some toxic workplaces discriminate only
against mothers even though fathers can also be affected from this environment).
121. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
122. See generally Kenney, supra note 120.
123.ld.
124. Prosser, supra note 76, at 1120 (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,
441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
125. See, e.g., Joan E. Steinman, Women, Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 409 (1992).
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Arguably, a prime example of this trend is section 6(c) of the Products
Liability Restatement. 12 Section 6(c), which governs design defect
liability for prescription drugs and medical devices, is one of the most
controversial sections of the Products Liability Restatement since it
requires the patient to prove that no reasonable healthcare Erovider
would have prescribed the product for any class of patients. 1 7 Thus,
in order for a patient to bring a successful claim for design defect,
product users must demonstrate that they suffered harm and that no
patient class could have derived benefit from the prescription drug or
medical device. This new standard basically relieves medical product
manufacturers of liability and responsibility. Since women consume
more prescription drugs and products than men, 128 they are likely to be
more disadvantaged by section 6(c). First, women consume a greater
share of medical products than men. 129 Second, the regulatory system
has not adequately tested and monitored products intended for women
since men are generally the prototypes for medical studies and
testing. 130
Significantly, section 6(c) is not the only Products Liability
Restatement provision which defines product design defect. Section 2
establishes a separate standard of liability for defective product
design. 131 This standard of liability for general product design is
separate from medical or prescription products. 132 Section 2 allows an
aggrieved product user more latitude in establishing design defect
126. Products Liability Restatement, § 6(c) states:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or
medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health care providers, knowing of
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the
drug or medical device for any class of patients.

127.ld.
128. L. Elizabeth Bowles, The Disfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials: The
Legal Ramifications of and Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 Vand. L.
Rev. 877, 878 (1992) (discussing the fact that women consume more prescription drugs
than men and disproportionately suffer a greater number of side effects from these
drugs).
129. See, e.g., Joan E. Steinman, Women, Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 409 (1992).
130.ld.
131. See Products Liability Restatement, §§ 2(b), 6(c). "Because of the special nature of
prescription drugs and medical devices, the determination of whether such products are
not reasonably safe is to be made under Subsections (c) and (d) rather than under §§ 2(b)
and 2(c)." Id. § 6 cmt. b.
132. Products Liability Restatement § 2 cmt. a.
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liability.
The Reporters of the Restatement admit that the
requirements to establish general design liability are less stringent than
those for medical products. I 33 Rather than proving that the product
was ineffective for all users, section 2 allows the product user to
present a reasonable alternative design as an effective means of
establishing a design defect claim for general product defectiveness. 134
The Restatement offers comment (e) as an exception to the liability
standard for general product design defect claims in section 2.135
Comment (e) provides that if the product's design renders its social
utility low in relation to its potential to cause harm, liability attaches
even though no reasonable alternative design exists. 136 The reasoning
behind comment (e) is that rigid liability standards should not apply to
products with extremely low social utility.137 Unfortunately, section
6(c) does not have the same exception for prescription drugs and
medical devices design defect claims.
Simply stated, not all
prescription drugs deserve special protection for public policy reasons;
a cosmetic drug is not as important as life-saving chemotherapy.
The seriousness of the general product defect exception in comment
(e) is most harshly felt when examining these new theories of liability
from the vantage point of the injured female patient. Clearly, adopting
this exception to women asserting medical product design defect
claims would lighten the female patient's legal burden. In turn, this
would shift the focus from maximization of product manufacturer
profits to appropriate concern for patient safety.
Lucinda Finley argues that, "[T]orts suits define and signify basic
social values about what human activities are worthy of protecting ..
. ,,138 Unfortunately, the new standard established by section 6(c) of
the Products Liability Restatement does not seem to value women's
health and safety over corporate profits. The tort reform achieved by
133. See id. § 6 cm!. f, (arguing Subsection c of section 6 imposes a more rigorous test for
defect than does section 2(b) which does not apply to prescription drugs and medical
devices).
134. ld. § 2(b). This section provides a product defect:

[I]s defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of
the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.
135. See id. § 2 cm!. e.
136. See id.
137.ld.
138. Finley, supra note 34, at 849.
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the Products Liability Restatement reduces corporate liability and
responsibility, resulting in an increase in corporate profits and a
decrease in patient safety. Since men and women are different
biologically, women suffer injuries from defective reproductive
products placed inside their bodies, while men are seldom injured by
such products. 139 These injuries suffered by women are difficult to
assess in traditional economic terms, since they affect reproductive
loss and other noneconomic losses. 140 Often these reproductive and
emotional harms are not compensated in traditional tort damages. 141
Nevertheless, they affect women's economic, educational and career
choices. 142 The traditional tort approach, as exemplified by the
Products Liability Restatement, tells women that their value in the
labor force is not important enough to be incorporated into the marketbased tort reform formula. 143 Not only is the Products Liability
Restatement approach unfair to those women harmed by medical
products, it also sends a message to society as a whole that women are
less valuable than their male counterparts. 144
VII. CONCLUSION
Maryland tort law discriminates against women in a number of
important ways. Although facially neutral, the Maryland statutory cap
on noneconomic damages and the standard for awarding punitive
139. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 12, at 48.
140. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 34, at 857-58. Many of these defective, unsafe products have
been intended for the use by healthy women to affect, interrupt, or enhance natural bodily
processes, rather than to treat illness or disease. They include: (1) Des, a synthetic
estrogen marketed to prevent miscarriage which proved ineffective for that purpose, but
elevated the risk of breast cancer among the exposed mothers by forty percent, and which
caused cancer, reproductive abnormalities and infertility in the exposed daughters and
sons of the pregnant women who took it; (2) Early versions of birth control pills which
had high hormone levels that caused strokes, heart attacks and blood clots; (3) IUDs such
as the Dalkon Shield and Copper-7, which presented an elevated risk of pelvic
inflammatory disease, sterility, perforated uteruses and septic abortions; and (4) Parlodel,
a drug prescribed to suppress lactation. which proved ineffective and caused deaths from
strokes or heart attacks. See id. at 869.
141. [d. at 857-58.
142. [d. at 858.
143. Finley, A Break in the Silence, supra note 27, at 52. The disparate impact of marketbased damage measurement is derived from two principle sources: I) the generally lower
value the market assigns to women's work and 2) the market's failure to recognize or
value many productive activities in which women engage, such as household
management and care-taking performed within the family.
144. [d. As Professor Martha Chamallas has noted, earning-based damages calculations signal
that white men are worth more, and reinforce beliefs that they will achieve more than
white women or minority men and women. Chamallas, supra note 19, at 197-98.
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damages disadvantage women litigants. Moreover, adoption of the
Products Liability Restatement would exacerbate the situation.
Adding to this problem is Maryland's failure to adopt the doctrine of
comparative negligence. The current Maryland approach is confusing
and unfair. Disadvantaging women may be an unintended result of the
current Maryland regime. Nevertheless, it should be remedied.
Maryland tort law should take women's experiences and lives
seriously.

